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@@ -42,17 +42,18 @@ The module (`nixos-module/default.nix`, `config.services.hortusfox-web`) wires H
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- **`cp` carries the store's read-only mode onto the copy.** Every directory `cp -r` creates inherits the store's `555` (no write) mode, so the script reopens them for writing (`find "${runDir}" -type d -exec chmod u+w {} +`, directories only, never individual files) before it can `rm`/relink anything under them.
|
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- **Writable subdirs are seeded, not just replaced.** `cache`, `app/logs`, `public/img`, `public/attachments`, `public/backup`, `public/themes` get swapped for symlinks into persistent state (`stateDir = /var/lib/hortusfox`). Two of these (`public/img`, `public/themes`) ship real default assets in the package itself (login background, default theme) — naively replacing them with an empty persistent dir on first boot silently deletes those defaults and breaks page rendering (`Exception: Resource "img/pattern.jpg" not found`). The fix: before symlinking, `cp -rn` (no-clobber) the package's copy of each writable dir into `stateDir/<dir>` first, so shipped defaults get seeded in (and any *new* ones added by a future upstream bump get picked up too) without ever touching a file the user/app has already written.
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- **Nested writable dirs need their own tmpfiles rule for the parent, too.** `systemd.tmpfiles.rules` declares a `d` line per entry in `writableDirs`, but `app/logs` and the four `public/*` entries are nested under `app`/`public`, which have no rule of their own. `systemd-tmpfiles` auto-vivifies a missing parent for a nested `d` line, but does so with default `root:root 0755` ownership and does **not** reliably go on to create the requested leaf — so `app/logs` (and all of `public/*`) silently never got created, and the hortusfox-setup service's own `mkdir -p "${stateDir}/${d}"` would fail with `Permission denied` trying to create the leaf inside a root-owned, not-writable-by-`cfg.user` parent. Fixed by computing `writableDirParents` (the unique set of intermediate dirs, e.g. `app`, `public`) and giving each its own explicit tmpfiles `d` rule, ordered before the leaves. If you add a new *nested* entry to `writableDirs`, make sure its parent is covered by this too.
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||||
- **`public/backup` gets auto-cleaned; nothing else does.** HortusFox's own export/auto-backup feature (`BackupModule`/`BackupController`) writes to `public/backup/hf_backup_<timestamp>.zip` — a fully predictable filename — and never deletes it itself (the auto-backup cron only does so when an external `backup_path` is also configured in the admin panel; the manual "Export" flow never does). Since `public/backup` is served as a real static file by nginx/caddy before ever reaching the app's own auth-gated routes, that zip — a full data export — is downloadable by anyone who knows or guesses the timestamp, indefinitely. This is upstream's own design and can't be fixed from here, but `writableDirAges` gives `public/backup`'s tmpfiles `d` rule an `age` field driven by the `backupMaxAge` option (default `"1d"`, `null` disables), so `systemd-tmpfiles-clean.timer` prunes old exports and bounds the exposure window. Every other `writableDirs` entry keeps `age = "-"` (never auto-cleaned) via `writableDirAges.${d} or "-"`.
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- **`RuntimeDirectoryMode` and `stateDir`'s tmpfiles rules must both stay world-readable (`0755`).** nginx/caddy run as their own user, not `cfg.user`, and need to `stat`/read everything under `runDir` *and* into `stateDir`'s writable subdirs (`public/img` etc., reached through symlinks from `runDir`) to serve `public/` directly. At `0750` the proxy can't even traverse the directory, `tryFiles`/`file_server` stats fail with `Permission denied`, and — this is the trap — the site can still *appear* to work, because PHP-FPM (running as `cfg.user`) serves pages fine over fastcgi regardless of the proxy's own filesystem access; only requests for *static* files (not routed through PHP) actually exercise this path. A plain `curl` on `/` won't catch it; the VM tests fetch a real static asset and grep the proxy's own log for `Permission denied` specifically because of it. Nothing secret is exposed by the world-readable mode: `.env` is a symlink to `stateDir/.env`, which stays `600` independently.
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- **`.env` rendering.** A base attrset of env vars (`envVars`) is merged with the freeform `cfg.settings` attrset (`envVars // cfg.settings`, so `settings` always wins) and serialized to KEY=VALUE lines via `pkgs.writeText`. `envVars` isn't just our curated options (`domain`/`timezone`/`database.name`/`smtp.*`) — it mirrors the *entire* default set from upstream's `.env.example` (app metadata, session duration, photo-resize factors, `SMTP_AUTH`, `APP_BASEDIR`, ...). Leaving any of these out isn't cosmetic: several app code paths read `$_ENV[...]` directly with no `isset()` guard (`APP_BASEDIR` in particular), so an omitted key produces a `PHP Warning: Undefined array key` on *every single request*, not just a missing feature. `APP_VERSION` derives from `package.version` rather than being duplicated by hand, so it can't drift from `package.nix` on a version bump. Secrets are handled separately: if `cfg.secretFile` is set, its contents are `cat`'d verbatim onto the end of the rendered file at runtime — it is *not* parsed or filtered, so it can carry arbitrary keys (`APP_KEY`, `SMTP_PASSWORD`, custom API keys, …). The rendered file lands in `stateDir/.env`, then is symlinked into `runDir`.
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- **`settings.APP_DEBUG` matters more than it looks.** Upstream's `asatru` CLI (`app root`/`asatru` file) refuses to run at all unless `APP_DEBUG` is true — it just prints a warning and exits 0. That means the `hortusfox-setup` service's `php asatru migrate:fresh`/`migrate:upgrade` calls are silent no-ops unless `settings.APP_DEBUG = true` (or it's set via `secretFile`). The module's own default is `APP_DEBUG = false`, so **migrations do not run out of the box** — this is why `tests/default.nix` and both `vm-test`s explicitly set `settings.APP_DEBUG = true`.
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- **First-boot vs. upgrade migrations.** `stateDir/.installed` is the marker: absent → `php asatru migrate:fresh` (destructive schema create) runs and then creates the marker; present → `php asatru migrate:upgrade || true` runs instead. This is the guard against re-running a destructive migration against real data — don't remove it without understanding why it's there.
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- **`adminAccount.passwordFile` actually seeds an admin account.** This was previously a documented no-op; it isn't anymore, because there is no other way to log in at all. `migrate:fresh` creates schema only, no rows. HortusFox has no CLI/seed hook of its own, and its only "create user" flow lives in the admin panel — which requires already being logged in as an admin. So on first boot only (same `.installed` guard as migrations), if this is set, the setup script bcrypt-hashes the file's contents via `php -r '...password_hash(...)...'` (matching `UserModel`'s own hashing) and `INSERT`s a row directly into the `UserModel` table (name `admin`, email `adminAccount.email` — defaults to `admin@<domain>` but is independently overridable, since that default isn't necessarily a mailbox anyone controls and HortusFox's own "Restore password" flow emails it — admin flag set), bypassing the app's normal create-then-promote two-step flow since neither step is reachable yet. Both `vm-test`s exercise a full cookie-jar login against this seeded account, including scraping the CSRF token from `/auth` and checking the final URL isn't `/auth` again — page content alone isn't reliable here, since the dashboard's own (hidden) change-password form makes "does the response contain a password field" a false-positive-prone check.
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- **`adminAccount.passwordFile` actually seeds an admin account.** This was previously a documented no-op; it isn't anymore, because there is no other way to log in at all. `migrate:fresh` creates schema only, no rows. HortusFox has no CLI/seed hook of its own, and its only "create user" flow lives in the admin panel — which requires already being logged in as an admin. So on first boot only (same `.installed` guard as migrations), if this is set, the setup script bcrypt-hashes the file's contents via `php -r '...password_hash(...)...'` (matching `UserModel`'s own hashing) and `INSERT`s a row directly into the `UserModel` table (name `adminAccount.username`, default `"admin"`, purely a display name since HortusFox logs in by email; email `adminAccount.email` — defaults to `admin@<domain>` but is independently overridable, since that default isn't necessarily a mailbox anyone controls and HortusFox's own "Restore password" flow emails it — admin flag set), bypassing the app's normal create-then-promote two-step flow since neither step is reachable yet. Both `vm-test`s exercise a full cookie-jar login against this seeded account, including scraping the CSRF token from `/auth` and checking the final URL isn't `/auth` again — page content alone isn't reliable here, since the dashboard's own (hidden) change-password form makes "does the response contain a password field" a false-positive-prone check.
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- **Serving.** `proxy.server` selects the reverse-proxy backend: `"nginx"` (default) or `"caddy"`, each gated by `lib.mkIf (cfg.proxy.server == "...")`. `proxy.ssl` (default `true`) toggles HTTPS/ACME on the vhost — nginx via `forceSSL`/`enableACME`, caddy by prefixing the site address with `http://` (which disables its automatic HTTPS for that vhost specifically) — set it to `false` for local/test deployments with no real domain or internet access to reach Let's Encrypt (both `vm-test`s and `tests/default.nix` do this). `services.phpfpm.pools.hortusfox` runs as `cfg.user`/`cfg.group` regardless of proxy backend, but its fastcgi socket's `listen.owner`/`listen.group` must match whichever proxy is actually enabled (`config.services.caddy.user`/`.group` vs `config.services.nginx.user`/`.group`) — this was hardcoded to nginx before caddy support existed. nginx uses explicit `tryFiles`/location blocks (an Asatru-framework-style rewrite-to-`index.php` rule, mirroring upstream's `.htaccess`); caddy's `php_fastcgi` directive covers the same rewrite-then-serve behavior natively. Dotfiles are denied on both. When `proxy.ssl = true`, the deploying host config must set nginx's `security.acme.{acceptTerms,defaults.email}` or caddy's `services.caddy.email` globally (see comment at the bottom of the module).
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- **`port` also has to override `SERVER_PORT` at the fastcgi layer, not just `APP_URL`.** Asatru's own `url()`/`asset()` helpers (`vendor/danielbrendel/asatru-php-framework/src/helper.php`) never read `APP_URL` at all — they build every absolute URL straight from `$_SERVER['SERVER_NAME']`/`SERVER_PORT`. Nginx's/Caddy's default fastcgi env populates `SERVER_PORT` from the port the proxy itself is listening on (e.g. the QEMU test VM's unforwarded guest port 80), not an externally-reachable/forwarded one (e.g. the hostfwd'd 8080) — so with only `APP_URL` fixed, page HTML still loaded fine (that request itself hits the forwarded port directly) but every asset/CSS/JS URL the app *generates* silently dropped the port, breaking every static asset (`net::ERR_CONNECTION_REFUSED` in the browser, since nothing listens on host port 80). Fixed by explicitly overriding the `SERVER_PORT` fastcgi param/env var to `cfg.port` whenever it's set — nginx via an extra `fastcgi_param SERVER_PORT "...";` line after `include fastcgi_params` (later same-name `fastcgi_param` wins), caddy via `php_fastcgi`'s `env SERVER_PORT ...` sub-directive. Verified by booting `nixosConfigurations.test` manually and confirming assets load over the forwarded port.
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- **Systemd sandboxing, and the umask trap.** `hortusfox-setup` and the cron services share a `commonHardening` serviceConfig attrset (NoNewPrivileges, Protect*, Restrict*, LockPersonality, RemoveIPC, RestrictAddressFamilies = `AF_UNIX`/`AF_INET`/`AF_INET6` for the mysql socket and SMTP/cron's loopback curl); `phpfpm-hortusfox` instead tightens `services.phpfpm`'s own baseline (`ProtectSystem` "full" → "strict" via `lib.mkForce`, since the phpfpm module sets it as a plain assignment) plus `ReadWritePaths = [ stateDir ]`. `hortusfox-setup`'s `ProtectSystem = "strict"` needs no extra `ReadWritePaths` since its declared `StateDirectory`/`RuntimeDirectory` are auto-exempted. Deliberately excluded: `UMask` — a tighter umask (e.g. `0027`) looks like obvious hardening, but silently reintroduces the exact "Permission denied" static-asset bug fixed above, since it changes what mode `cp -r`/`mkdir` produce for files hortusfox-setup writes to `runDir`/`stateDir` and phpfpm writes to (e.g. uploaded `public/attachments`) — from world-readable 0755/0644 down to 0750/0640 — and the later `find ... chmod u+w` only adds the owner-write bit back, it can't restore group/other bits umask already stripped at creation time. Also excluded: `MemoryDenyWriteExecute` (PHP/Zend may want executable heap for opcache) and `SystemCallFilter` (broad surface, easy to break something subtle in migrations/mysql/zip handling) — this is a first pass at blast-radius reduction, not maximal hardening, and was verified against both `vm-test`s (full boot + login) before landing.
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- **Cron.** HortusFox's cron endpoints (task overdue/tomorrow/recurring reminders, calendar reminders, auto-backup) are driven by `curl`ing the app's own HTTP cron routes from systemd timers (`hortusfox-cron-<name>` service+timer pairs), rather than an in-process scheduler. These live in the *same* `systemd.services` attrset as `hortusfox-setup`/`phpfpm-hortusfox` (merged in with `//`, generated via `lib.mapAttrs'` over `cronjobs`) — keep it that way; splitting the cron services into a second top-level `systemd.services = ...;` binding is a Nix duplicate-attribute error (partial-path assignments like `systemd.services.hortusfox-setup = ...` can't coexist with a later full `systemd.services = ...` reassignment in the same module).
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## Current state / known issues
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- `nix flake check` passes cleanly for all outputs (`packages`, `checks.build`, `checks.vm-test`, `checks.vm-test-caddy`, `overlays`, `nixosModules`, `nixosConfigurations.test`), and the VM actually serves a working, loggable-into site end-to-end for both proxy backends (verified via the automated `vm-test`s and by booting `nixosConfigurations.test` manually and logging in over HTTP with `tests/hortusfox_web_test_password`). Note `tests/default.nix` carries a `fileSystems."/"`/`boot.loader.grub.devices`/`security.acme` stanza purely so `config.system.build.toplevel` (what `nix flake check` builds) evaluates — the VM is actually built and run via `.config.system.build.vm` (see `justfile`'s `build-vm`/`boot-vm`), which doesn't use any of that.
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- Upstream's own templates still emit a `PHP Deprecated: htmlspecialchars(): Passing null to parameter #1` notice on some pages (PHP 8.1+ deprecation for `htmlspecialchars(null)`). Harmless and not something this repo can fix — it's app code, not packaging.
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- `flake.nix.bk` is a stale, syntactically-broken (extra paren) prior draft of `flake.nix`, kept around for reference; it's not a flake input and isn't loaded by anything.
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@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
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# hortusfox-web-nixos
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A Nix flake that packages [HortusFox](https://github.com/danielbrendel/hortusfox-web) — a self-hosted,
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PHP/Laravel-style collaborative plant-management app — from source, and provides a NixOS module to run it
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as a full service: mariadb + phpfpm + nginx or caddy + ACME + the app's own cron endpoints on systemd
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timers.
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There is no HortusFox source code in this repo — the app itself is fetched from upstream at build time via
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`php.buildComposerProject`. This repo is purely packaging and deployment glue: a `package.nix` derivation
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and a `services.hortusfox-web` NixOS module that wires the built package into a real, stateful host.
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## Flake outputs
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| Output | What it is |
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| --- | --- |
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| `packages.hortusfox-web` / `packages.default` | The built HortusFox package. |
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| `overlays.default` | Adds `hortusfox-web` to `pkgs`. |
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| `nixosModules.default` | The `services.hortusfox-web` module. |
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| `devShells.default` | PHP (matching the module's build) + extensions, composer, `just`, `nix-output-monitor`. |
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| `checks.<system>.build` | Builds the package. |
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| `checks.<system>.vm-test` / `vm-test-caddy` | Boots a full nixosTest VM per proxy backend and exercises a real login. |
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| `nixosConfigurations.test` | A throwaway VM (`tests/`) for manual poking — not meant for real deployments. |
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## Usage
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```nix
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{
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inputs.hortusfox-web.url = "github:<you>/hortusfox-web-nixos";
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outputs = { self, nixpkgs, hortusfox-web, ... }: {
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nixosConfigurations.myhost = nixpkgs.lib.nixosSystem {
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system = "x86_64-linux";
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modules = [
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hortusfox-web.nixosModules.default
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{
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services.hortusfox-web = {
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enable = true;
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domain = "plants.example.com";
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adminAccount.passwordFile = "/run/secrets/hortusfox-admin-password";
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adminAccount.email = "you@example.com";
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secretFile = "/run/secrets/hortusfox.env"; # APP_KEY, SMTP_PASSWORD, ...
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};
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# proxy.ssl defaults to true (forceSSL + ACME); the host config
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# must then set one of these globally:
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security.acme = { acceptTerms = true; defaults.email = "you@example.com"; };
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# or, if services.hortusfox-web.proxy.server = "caddy":
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# services.caddy.email = "you@example.com";
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}
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];
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};
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};
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}
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```
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## `services.hortusfox-web` options
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| Option | Type | Default | Description |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| `enable` | bool | `false` | Enable the service. |
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| `domain` | string | `"localhost"` | FQDN served over HTTPS; used for the nginx/caddy vhost and ACME. |
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| `port` | null or port | `null` | Appended to the app's own canonical URL (`APP_URL`) and, when set, overrides the `SERVER_PORT` fastcgi param/env seen by PHP. Needed whenever the proxy is only reachable through a forwarded/non-standard port (e.g. the test VM's QEMU hostfwd) — Asatru's own `url()`/`asset()` helpers build every absolute URL from the *request's* `SERVER_PORT`, not from `APP_URL`, so without this every generated asset/redirect URL silently drops the real external port. Does not change what port nginx/caddy actually listen on. |
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| `package` | package | built from `package.nix` | The HortusFox package to deploy. |
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| `proxy.server` | `"nginx"` \| `"caddy"` | `"nginx"` | Reverse proxy/webserver fronting phpfpm. |
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| `proxy.ssl` | bool | `true` | Force HTTPS + request an ACME cert for the vhost. Set `false` for local/test deployments with no real domain or internet access to reach Let's Encrypt. |
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| `phpPackage` | package | `pkgs.php83` | Base PHP the phpfpm environment is built from (extensions are added automatically). |
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| `user` / `group` | string | `"hortusfox"` | System user/group the app and its phpfpm pool run as. |
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| `timezone` | string | `"UTC"` | App timezone (`APP_TIMEZONE`). |
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| `database.name` | string | `"hortusfox"` | MariaDB database name. |
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| `secretFile` | null or path | `null` | File of `KEY=VALUE` lines (`APP_KEY`, `SMTP_PASSWORD`, API keys, ...) appended verbatim onto the generated `.env` at runtime — not parsed, so it can carry arbitrary keys. Keep it out of the Nix store in production (agenix/sops-nix); a store path is fine for throwaway test configs. Read by `hortusfox-setup`, which runs as the module's system user, not root — make sure its owner/group lets that user read it. |
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| `backupMaxAge` | null or string | `"1d"` | How long HortusFox's own export/auto-backup zips (`public/backup`, systemd-tmpfiles "age" syntax, e.g. `"1d"`, `"12h"`) are kept before auto-deletion. HortusFox names these with a fully predictable `hf_backup_<timestamp>.zip` pattern and serves them from the public webroot without ever cleaning them up itself, so anyone who knows or guesses the timestamp can otherwise download a full data export indefinitely. `null` disables cleanup entirely (not recommended for internet-facing deployments). |
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||||
| `adminAccount.passwordFile` | null or path | `null` | Plaintext password file for a seeded initial admin account. HortusFox has no CLI/seed hook of its own and its only "create user" flow lives behind the admin panel, so without this a fresh deployment has no way to log in at all. Only takes effect on first boot; changing it later has no effect on an existing account. Read by `hortusfox-setup` under the same non-root user as `secretFile` above. |
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| `adminAccount.username` | string | `"admin"` | Name for the seeded admin account — purely a display name, since HortusFox logs in by email rather than this field. |
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||||
| `adminAccount.email` | string | `"admin@${domain}"` | Email for the seeded admin account. The default is just a guess at a real mailbox — set it to an address you actually control if you intend to use HortusFox's "Restore password" flow, which emails it. |
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||||
| `settings` | attrs of str/int/bool | `{ }` | Extra/overriding `.env` entries, merged over the module's generated defaults (`settings` always wins). Note `php asatru` (used for migrations) only runs when `APP_DEBUG` is true, so migrations silently no-op unless it's set here or via `secretFile`. |
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||||
| `smtp.host` | string | `""` | SMTP server host. |
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| `smtp.port` | port | `587` | SMTP server port. |
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| `smtp.username` | string | `""` | SMTP username. |
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||||
| `smtp.fromName` | string | `"HortusFox"` | SMTP from-name. |
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| `smtp.fromAddress` | string | `"hortusfox@localhost"` | SMTP from-address. |
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| `smtp.encryption` | `"tls"` \| `"ssl"` \| `""` | `"tls"` | SMTP transport encryption. |
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SMTP password isn't a module option — set `SMTP_PASSWORD` via `secretFile` instead, alongside `APP_KEY`.
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||||
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## What the module actually does
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||||
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- Copies the read-only Nix store package into a writable runtime tree (`/run/hortusfox/www`) on every boot,
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then symlinks a handful of subdirectories (`cache`, `app/logs`, `public/img`, `public/attachments`,
|
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`public/backup`, `public/themes`) into persistent state under `/var/lib/hortusfox`, seeding them from the
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package's own shipped defaults first so nothing gets silently deleted on first boot.
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- Renders `.env` from the module's curated + mirrored-upstream defaults, `settings` (always wins), and
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`secretFile` (appended verbatim).
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- Runs `php asatru migrate:fresh` on first boot (schema only) and `migrate:upgrade` on every boot after,
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||||
guarded by a `stateDir/.installed` marker so a destructive fresh migration never runs twice.
|
||||
- Optionally seeds a single admin account directly into the database on first boot, since HortusFox has no
|
||||
other way to create the very first user.
|
||||
- Drives HortusFox's own HTTP cron endpoints (task/calendar reminders, auto-backup) via systemd timers
|
||||
rather than an in-process scheduler.
|
||||
|
||||
See `nixos-module/default.nix` and `CLAUDE.md` for the full reasoning and the gotchas each of these design
|
||||
choices worked around (several were real, previously-shipped bugs).
|
||||
|
||||
## Local development / testing
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nix develop # dev shell: PHP+extensions, composer, just, nix-output-monitor
|
||||
just build-vm # build the throwaway test VM (nixosConfigurations.test)
|
||||
just boot-vm # boot it in-terminal (QEMU, serial console); http://127.0.0.1:8080
|
||||
just clean # tear down local VM artifacts (this project's own qemu instance + build outputs)
|
||||
|
||||
nix flake check # evaluate all outputs; builds the package + boots both proxy-backend VM tests
|
||||
nix flake check -L # same, with full build/VM logs streamed (slow: boots two real VMs)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The test VM's seeded admin account logs in with the password in `tests/hortusfox_web_test_password`
|
||||
(currently `password`) — see `tests/default.nix` for its full config.
|
||||
-44
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
description = "HortusFox — self-hosted plant manager, from source";
|
||||
|
||||
inputs.nixpkgs.url = "github:NixOS/nixpkgs/nixos-unstable";
|
||||
inputs.flake-utils.url = "github:numtide/flake-utils";
|
||||
|
||||
outputs = { self, nixpkgs, flake-utils }:
|
||||
flake-utils.lib.eachDefaultSystem (system:
|
||||
let
|
||||
systems = [ "x86_64-linux" "aarch64-linux" ];
|
||||
forEachSystem = nixpkgs.lib.genAttrs systems;
|
||||
pkgs = nixpkgs.legacyPackages.${system};
|
||||
|
||||
overlayList = [ self.overlays.default ];
|
||||
|
||||
pkgsBySystem = forEachSystem (
|
||||
system:
|
||||
import nixpkgs {
|
||||
inherit system;
|
||||
overlays = overlayList;
|
||||
}
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
in {
|
||||
nixosConfigurations.test = nixpkgs.lib.nixosSystem {
|
||||
inherit system;
|
||||
modules = [ ./tests ];
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
overlays.default = final: prev: { hortusfox-web = final.callPackage ./package.nix { }; };
|
||||
|
||||
packages = {
|
||||
hortusfox-web = pkgs.${system}.hortusfox-web;
|
||||
default = pkgs.${system}.hortusfox-web;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
nixosModules.default = import ./nixos-module { overlays = overlayList; };
|
||||
|
||||
# Handy for `nix flake check` on a throwaway host
|
||||
checks = forEachSystem (system: {
|
||||
build = pkgsBySystem.${system}.hortusfox-web;
|
||||
});
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
Generated
+4
-4
@@ -2,16 +2,16 @@
|
||||
"nodes": {
|
||||
"nixpkgs": {
|
||||
"locked": {
|
||||
"lastModified": 1786599213,
|
||||
"narHash": "sha256-yNJd40f11EzXBjSByCB7IPpeFFAdeoSKKM67dGkfFoU=",
|
||||
"lastModified": 1791031588,
|
||||
"narHash": "sha256-/FGDr01siZ8txrVzkOz6CYjiz0XR27JuVJP+aWchi4s=",
|
||||
"owner": "NixOS",
|
||||
"repo": "nixpkgs",
|
||||
"rev": "0e251e24a4f24e036a084b6b4b2d2491af4167f4",
|
||||
"rev": "825e2028c29b702a4a5f085f08095d12099784f2",
|
||||
"type": "github"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"original": {
|
||||
"owner": "NixOS",
|
||||
"ref": "nixos-unstable",
|
||||
"ref": "nixos-26.05",
|
||||
"repo": "nixpkgs",
|
||||
"type": "github"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
description = "HortusFox — self-hosted plant manager, from source";
|
||||
|
||||
inputs.nixpkgs.url = "github:NixOS/nixpkgs/nixos-unstable";
|
||||
inputs.nixpkgs.url = "github:NixOS/nixpkgs/nixos-26.05";
|
||||
inputs.utils.url = "github:numtide/flake-utils";
|
||||
inputs.systems.url = "github:nix-systems/default";
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+255
-16
@@ -23,12 +23,36 @@ let
|
||||
runDir = "/run/hortusfox/www"; # ephemeral symlink tree (tmpfs)
|
||||
stateDir = "/var/lib/hortusfox"; # persistent writable data
|
||||
|
||||
# The app's CronjobsController requires a `?cronpw=` query param matching
|
||||
# AppModel.cronjob_pw (see hortusfox-setup's step 5 below) -- cache that
|
||||
# value here, readable only by cfg.user, so the cron units below can read
|
||||
# it back at request time without ever going through Nix (cronjob_pw is
|
||||
# DB-generated at install time, not a Nix-level secret).
|
||||
cronPwFile = "${stateDir}/.cronjob-pw";
|
||||
|
||||
# Writable subdirs that must survive reboots.
|
||||
writableDirs = [
|
||||
"cache" "app/logs"
|
||||
"public/img" "public/attachments" "public/backup" "public/themes"
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
# systemd-tmpfiles "age" overrides for specific writableDirs (default: "-",
|
||||
# never auto-cleaned). public/backup is HortusFox's own export/auto-backup
|
||||
# destination, named with a fully predictable `hf_backup_<timestamp>.zip`
|
||||
# pattern (see BackupModule/BackupController upstream) and -- since it
|
||||
# lives under public/, served as a real static file by nginx/caddy before
|
||||
# ever reaching the app's own auth-gated routes -- effectively downloadable
|
||||
# by anyone who knows or guesses that timestamp, indefinitely, since
|
||||
# upstream never deletes it (the auto-backup cron only does so when an
|
||||
# external backup_path is also configured in the admin panel; the manual
|
||||
# "Export" flow never does). We can't fix upstream's public-webroot
|
||||
# placement or predictable naming from here, but pruning anything older
|
||||
# than backupMaxAge bounds how long a given export stays fetchable, via
|
||||
# systemd's own periodic systemd-tmpfiles-clean.timer.
|
||||
writableDirAges = {
|
||||
"public/backup" = if cfg.backupMaxAge == null then "-" else cfg.backupMaxAge;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
# Intermediate parent dirs of the above (e.g. "app", "public") that need
|
||||
# their own explicit tmpfiles rule too: systemd-tmpfiles auto-vivifies a
|
||||
# missing parent when processing a nested `d` line, but does so with
|
||||
@@ -41,6 +65,15 @@ let
|
||||
in if builtins.length parts > 1 then lib.concatStringsSep "/" (lib.init parts) else null)
|
||||
writableDirs));
|
||||
|
||||
# Escape a value for interpolation into a single-quoted SQL string literal
|
||||
# (used for the admin-seed INSERT below). Doubling backslashes first, then
|
||||
# quotes, matches MySQL/MariaDB's default (backslash-escapes-active)
|
||||
# string literal rules -- without this, an ordinary value like "O'Brien"
|
||||
# breaks the INSERT's SQL syntax outright (failing hortusfox-setup on
|
||||
# first boot, since the script runs under `set -euo pipefail`), and a
|
||||
# crafted value could inject arbitrary SQL.
|
||||
sqlEscape = s: lib.replaceStrings [ "\\" "'" ] [ "\\\\" "''" ] s;
|
||||
|
||||
# Render one KEY=VALUE .env line. Booleans/ints/floats are left bare so
|
||||
# Asatru's datatype auto-detection picks them up as such rather than string.
|
||||
mkEnvLine = name: value:
|
||||
@@ -65,8 +98,8 @@ let
|
||||
APP_CONTACT = "dbrendel1988@gmail.com";
|
||||
APP_DEBUG = false;
|
||||
APP_BASEDIR = "";
|
||||
APP_LANG = "en";
|
||||
APP_WORKSPACE = "My workspace";
|
||||
APP_LANG = cfg.language;
|
||||
APP_WORKSPACE = cfg.workspace;
|
||||
APP_OVERDUETASK_HOURS = 10;
|
||||
APP_CRONJOB_MAILLIMIT = 5;
|
||||
APP_GITHUB_URL = "https://github.com/danielbrendel/hortusfox-web";
|
||||
@@ -112,6 +145,71 @@ let
|
||||
lib.concatStringsSep "\n" (lib.mapAttrsToList mkEnvLine envVars) + "\n"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
# Cron jobs curl the app's own loopback address rather than its
|
||||
# externally-reachable appUrl, on the port nginx/caddy actually listen on
|
||||
# (80, or 443 when proxy.ssl -- never cfg.port, which per its own option
|
||||
# doc doesn't change that). Otherwise cron would depend on the host being
|
||||
# able to route back to its own public domain (hairpin NAT, not
|
||||
# guaranteed) and, whenever cfg.port is set to an externally-forwarded
|
||||
# port nginx/caddy don't themselves listen on (e.g. the QEMU test VM's
|
||||
# hostfwd), would curl a port nothing is listening on at all. curl's
|
||||
# --resolve pins the connection to 127.0.0.1 while keeping the
|
||||
# Host header/SNI as cfg.domain, so vhost routing and cert validation
|
||||
# still work normally.
|
||||
cronPort = if cfg.proxy.ssl then 443 else 80;
|
||||
cronUrl = path: "${scheme}://${cfg.domain}:${toString cronPort}${path}";
|
||||
|
||||
# The actual ExecStart for each cron unit: read the cached cronjob_pw
|
||||
# (written by hortusfox-setup) and append it as the `?cronpw=` query param
|
||||
# CronjobsController requires, or every cron request gets a bare 403.
|
||||
# A wrapper script rather than a plain curl invocation because systemd's
|
||||
# ExecStart doesn't run through a shell, so it can't itself do the
|
||||
# `$(cat ...)` substitution.
|
||||
cronScript = name: job: pkgs.writeShellScript "hortusfox-cron-${name}" ''
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
cronpw="$(${pkgs.coreutils}/bin/cat "${cronPwFile}")"
|
||||
exec ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -fsS --max-time 300 \
|
||||
--resolve ${cfg.domain}:${toString cronPort}:127.0.0.1 \
|
||||
"${cronUrl job.path}?cronpw=$cronpw"
|
||||
'';
|
||||
|
||||
# Baseline systemd sandboxing shared by this module's own units
|
||||
# (hortusfox-setup and the cron jobs; phpfpm-hortusfox gets its own,
|
||||
# layered on top of what services.phpfpm already sets). Deliberately
|
||||
# conservative: no MemoryDenyWriteExecute (PHP/Zend may want executable
|
||||
# heap for opcache) and no SystemCallFilter (broad surface, easy to break
|
||||
# something subtle in migrations/mysql/zip handling) -- this is a first
|
||||
# pass at blast-radius reduction, not maximal hardening. RestrictAddress-
|
||||
# Families keeps AF_INET/AF_INET6 (SMTP, cron's loopback curl) alongside
|
||||
# AF_UNIX (the mysql socket). Deliberately no UMask override: this
|
||||
# module's whole design (see the "world-readable 0755" notes elsewhere)
|
||||
# depends on hortusfox-setup's and phpfpm's default umask producing
|
||||
# world-readable files/dirs (0755/0644) for nginx/caddy, a different
|
||||
# user, to traverse and serve statically -- a tighter umask (e.g. 0027)
|
||||
# silently reintroduces the exact "Permission denied" static-asset bug
|
||||
# that was already fixed once, since a later `chmod u+w` only adds the
|
||||
# owner-write bit back and can't restore group/other bits umask stripped
|
||||
# at creation time.
|
||||
commonHardening = {
|
||||
NoNewPrivileges = true;
|
||||
ProtectHome = true;
|
||||
PrivateTmp = true;
|
||||
ProtectKernelTunables = true;
|
||||
ProtectKernelModules = true;
|
||||
ProtectKernelLogs = true;
|
||||
ProtectControlGroups = true;
|
||||
ProtectClock = true;
|
||||
ProtectHostname = true;
|
||||
ProtectProc = "invisible";
|
||||
ProcSubset = "pid";
|
||||
RestrictSUIDSGID = true;
|
||||
RestrictRealtime = true;
|
||||
RestrictNamespaces = true;
|
||||
LockPersonality = true;
|
||||
RemoveIPC = true;
|
||||
RestrictAddressFamilies = [ "AF_UNIX" "AF_INET" "AF_INET6" ];
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
# curl'd cron endpoints -> (name, path, calendar spec)
|
||||
cronjobs = {
|
||||
"tasks-overdue" = { path = "/cronjob/tasks/overdue"; when = "*-*-* 06,18:00:00"; };
|
||||
@@ -179,6 +277,23 @@ in {
|
||||
|
||||
timezone = lib.mkOption { type = lib.types.str; default = "UTC"; };
|
||||
|
||||
language = lib.mkOption {
|
||||
type = lib.types.str;
|
||||
default = "en";
|
||||
example = "de";
|
||||
description = ''
|
||||
UI language (APP_LANG). Must match one of the language codes
|
||||
upstream ships translation files for under lang/.
|
||||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
workspace = lib.mkOption {
|
||||
type = lib.types.str;
|
||||
default = "My workspace";
|
||||
example = "Greenhouse";
|
||||
description = "Workspace name shown in the UI (APP_WORKSPACE).";
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
database.name = lib.mkOption { type = lib.types.str; default = "hortusfox"; };
|
||||
|
||||
secretFile = lib.mkOption {
|
||||
@@ -189,7 +304,27 @@ in {
|
||||
File with secret KEY=VALUE lines (APP_KEY, SMTP_PASSWORD, API keys,
|
||||
...) appended verbatim to the generated .env at runtime. Keep it out
|
||||
of the Nix store in production (e.g. agenix/sops-nix); a store path
|
||||
is fine for throwaway test configs.
|
||||
is fine for throwaway test configs. Read by hortusfox-setup, which
|
||||
runs as cfg.user rather than root -- if you point this at an
|
||||
agenix/sops-nix secret, make sure its owner/group is set to
|
||||
cfg.user/cfg.group (or make it world-readable), or the service fails
|
||||
with a permission error.
|
||||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
backupMaxAge = lib.mkOption {
|
||||
type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.str;
|
||||
default = "1d";
|
||||
example = "7d";
|
||||
description = ''
|
||||
How long HortusFox's own export/auto-backup zips (written to
|
||||
public/backup, using systemd-tmpfiles "age" syntax, e.g. "1d",
|
||||
"12h") are kept before being auto-deleted. HortusFox names these
|
||||
files with a fully predictable hf_backup_<timestamp>.zip pattern and
|
||||
serves them from the public webroot without ever cleaning them up
|
||||
itself, so anyone who knows or guesses the timestamp can download a
|
||||
full data export indefinitely otherwise. Set to null to disable
|
||||
cleanup entirely (not recommended for internet-facing deployments).
|
||||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -205,16 +340,30 @@ in {
|
||||
a fresh deployment has no way to log in at all. Only used on first
|
||||
boot (guarded by the same stateDir/.installed marker as
|
||||
migrate:fresh); changing it afterwards has no effect on an
|
||||
existing account.
|
||||
existing account. Read by hortusfox-setup, which runs as cfg.user
|
||||
rather than root -- as with secretFile, make sure this file's
|
||||
owner/group lets cfg.user read it.
|
||||
|
||||
Seeds a user named "admin" (email set via adminAccount.email),
|
||||
bcrypt-hashed via `password_hash(..., PASSWORD_BCRYPT)` (matching
|
||||
UserModel's own hashing) and inserted directly into the UserModel
|
||||
table with the admin flag set, bypassing the app's normal two-step
|
||||
Seeds a user (name set via adminAccount.username, email via
|
||||
adminAccount.email), bcrypt-hashed via
|
||||
`password_hash(..., PASSWORD_BCRYPT)` (matching UserModel's own
|
||||
hashing) and inserted directly into the UserModel table with the
|
||||
admin flag set, bypassing the app's normal two-step
|
||||
create-then-promote admin-panel flow.
|
||||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
adminAccount.username = lib.mkOption {
|
||||
type = lib.types.str;
|
||||
default = "admin";
|
||||
example = "Jane Doe";
|
||||
description = ''
|
||||
Name for the seeded admin account (see adminAccount.passwordFile) --
|
||||
the UserModel table's "name" column. HortusFox logs in by email, not
|
||||
this field, so it's purely a display name shown in the app's UI.
|
||||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
adminAccount.email = lib.mkOption {
|
||||
type = lib.types.str;
|
||||
default = "admin@${cfg.domain}";
|
||||
@@ -252,6 +401,20 @@ in {
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
config = lib.mkIf cfg.enable {
|
||||
assertions = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
assertion = !(cfg.proxy.ssl && cfg.domain == "localhost");
|
||||
message = ''
|
||||
services.hortusfox-web: proxy.ssl = true (the default) requests an
|
||||
ACME certificate for services.hortusfox-web.domain, but domain is
|
||||
left at its own default of "localhost" -- Let's Encrypt can never
|
||||
issue a certificate for that, so this would only fail at runtime.
|
||||
Set domain to a real, publicly resolvable FQDN, or set
|
||||
proxy.ssl = false for a local/test deployment.
|
||||
'';
|
||||
}
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
users.users.${cfg.user} = {
|
||||
isSystemUser = true;
|
||||
group = cfg.group;
|
||||
@@ -279,7 +442,7 @@ in {
|
||||
systemd.tmpfiles.rules =
|
||||
[ "d ${stateDir} 0755 ${cfg.user} ${cfg.group} - -" ]
|
||||
++ map (d: "d ${stateDir}/${d} 0755 ${cfg.user} ${cfg.group} - -") writableDirParents
|
||||
++ map (d: "d ${stateDir}/${d} 0755 ${cfg.user} ${cfg.group} - -") writableDirs;
|
||||
++ map (d: "d ${stateDir}/${d} 0755 ${cfg.user} ${cfg.group} ${writableDirAges.${d} or "-"} -") writableDirs;
|
||||
|
||||
# Kept as one attrset: hortusfox-setup/phpfpm-hortusfox plus the
|
||||
# cron-generated services all live under systemd.services, and a
|
||||
@@ -292,7 +455,7 @@ in {
|
||||
requires = [ "mysql.service" ];
|
||||
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
|
||||
|
||||
serviceConfig = {
|
||||
serviceConfig = commonHardening // {
|
||||
Type = "oneshot";
|
||||
RemainAfterExit = true;
|
||||
User = cfg.user;
|
||||
@@ -304,6 +467,11 @@ in {
|
||||
# which stays mode 600 regardless of this.
|
||||
RuntimeDirectory = "hortusfox";
|
||||
RuntimeDirectoryMode = "0755";
|
||||
# Whole filesystem read-only except /dev, /proc, /sys and the
|
||||
# StateDirectory/RuntimeDirectory declared above, which systemd
|
||||
# auto-exempts -- everything this script writes to (stateDir,
|
||||
# runDir) is covered by those, so no extra ReadWritePaths needed.
|
||||
ProtectSystem = "strict";
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
path = [ phpPackage config.services.mysql.package pkgs.coreutils pkgs.gnused ];
|
||||
@@ -362,7 +530,43 @@ in {
|
||||
if [ ! -e "${stateDir}/.installed" ]; then
|
||||
php asatru migrate:fresh
|
||||
|
||||
# 5. Seed the initial admin account. migrate:fresh creates no
|
||||
# 5. Seed the AppModel settings row. migrate:fresh only creates
|
||||
# the (empty) table -- upstream's own web installer is what
|
||||
# inserts the single settings row that app()/AppModel's own
|
||||
# admin-panel features (the Environment tab's Language/
|
||||
# Timezone fields, SMTP toggle, etc.) read and write, and we
|
||||
# bypass that installer entirely. Without this row,
|
||||
# AppModel::updateSet()'s `UPDATE AppModel SET ...` -- no
|
||||
# WHERE clause, since it's a de-facto single-row table --
|
||||
# matches zero rows, so every "Save" in the admin Environment
|
||||
# tab reports success but silently changes nothing. This
|
||||
# includes Language/Timezone: those live here, not in .env
|
||||
# (.env's APP_LANG is only a fallback used when this row is
|
||||
# missing, and APP_TIMEZONE only sets PHP's global default
|
||||
# timezone -- see AppHelper.php/bootstrap.php upstream,
|
||||
# neither is what the admin UI's fields actually edit). It
|
||||
# also means app_mail_config() -- called at the top of every
|
||||
# single request/cronjob -- was overwriting $_ENV['SMTP_*']
|
||||
# with NULLs read from this nonexistent row on every request,
|
||||
# silently breaking outbound mail regardless of smtp.*/
|
||||
# secretFile; seeding smtp_* here fixes that too. smtp_password
|
||||
# is deliberately left NULL: it's secret-only (see
|
||||
# secretFile), not a plain Nix option, and leaving it NULL is
|
||||
# no regression versus the previous (rowless) behavior either
|
||||
# way. cronjob_pw is generated the same way AppModel's own
|
||||
# generateCronjobToken() does. Every other column either has
|
||||
# no corresponding Nix option yet or just mirrors the
|
||||
# migration's own column default, same as upstream's
|
||||
# installer does.
|
||||
cronjob_pw="$(php -r 'echo md5(random_bytes(55) . date("Y-m-d H:i:s"));')"
|
||||
# Cache it for the cron units (see cronScript above) -- this is
|
||||
# the only place that ever learns the value in plaintext outside
|
||||
# the DB itself.
|
||||
printf '%s' "$cronjob_pw" > "${cronPwFile}"
|
||||
chmod 600 "${cronPwFile}"
|
||||
mariadb "${cfg.database.name}" -e "INSERT INTO AppModel (id, workspace, language, timezone, scroller, chat_enable, chat_timelimit, chat_showusers, chat_indicator, chat_system, history_enable, history_name, enable_media_share, cronjob_pw, overlay_alpha, smtp_enable_auth, smtp_fromname, smtp_fromaddress, smtp_host, smtp_port, smtp_username, smtp_password, smtp_encryption, pwa_enable, owm_enable, owm_api_key, owm_latitude, owm_longitude, owm_unittype, owm_cache) VALUES (NULL, '${sqlEscape envVars.APP_WORKSPACE}', '${sqlEscape cfg.language}', '${sqlEscape cfg.timezone}', 1, 1, 5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 'History', 0, '$cronjob_pw', NULL, 1, '${sqlEscape cfg.smtp.fromName}', '${sqlEscape cfg.smtp.fromAddress}', '${sqlEscape cfg.smtp.host}', ${toString cfg.smtp.port}, '${sqlEscape cfg.smtp.username}', NULL, '${sqlEscape cfg.smtp.encryption}', 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 'default', 300);"
|
||||
|
||||
# 6. Seed the initial admin account. migrate:fresh creates no
|
||||
# user rows at all, and the app's only "create user" flow
|
||||
# lives behind the admin panel -- without this, a fresh
|
||||
# deployment has no way to log in, ever. Insert directly
|
||||
@@ -372,29 +576,53 @@ in {
|
||||
# this point.
|
||||
${lib.optionalString (cfg.adminAccount.passwordFile != null) ''
|
||||
admin_hash="$(php -r 'echo password_hash($argv[1], PASSWORD_BCRYPT);' "$(cat "${cfg.adminAccount.passwordFile}")")"
|
||||
mariadb "${cfg.database.name}" -e "INSERT INTO UserModel (name, email, password, admin) VALUES ('admin', '${cfg.adminAccount.email}', '$admin_hash', 1);"
|
||||
mariadb "${cfg.database.name}" -e "INSERT INTO UserModel (name, email, password, admin) VALUES ('${sqlEscape cfg.adminAccount.username}', '${sqlEscape cfg.adminAccount.email}', '$admin_hash', 1);"
|
||||
''}
|
||||
|
||||
touch "${stateDir}/.installed"
|
||||
else
|
||||
php asatru migrate:upgrade || true
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Backfill for deployments that installed before cronjob_pw was
|
||||
# cached to disk (it's always been DB-only until now): pull the
|
||||
# value AppModel already has back out, rather than regenerating
|
||||
# one that wouldn't match it.
|
||||
if [ ! -s "${cronPwFile}" ]; then
|
||||
mariadb -N "${cfg.database.name}" -e "SELECT cronjob_pw FROM AppModel LIMIT 1" > "${cronPwFile}"
|
||||
chmod 600 "${cronPwFile}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
phpfpm-hortusfox = {
|
||||
after = [ "hortusfox-setup.service" ];
|
||||
requires = [ "hortusfox-setup.service" ];
|
||||
# services.phpfpm already sets a reasonable baseline (PrivateTmp,
|
||||
# ProtectHome, ProtectSystem = "full", RestrictAddressFamilies).
|
||||
# Tighten ProtectSystem to "strict" (whole filesystem read-only
|
||||
# except /dev, /proc, /sys and explicit exceptions) -- stateDir is
|
||||
# the only path phpfpm actually needs to write to, since every
|
||||
# writable subdir under runDir is a symlink resolving there; runDir
|
||||
# itself (the app code) only needs to be read, which ProtectSystem
|
||||
# doesn't restrict. mkForce is needed since services.phpfpm sets
|
||||
# ProtectSystem = "full" as a plain (non-mkDefault) assignment.
|
||||
serviceConfig.ProtectSystem = lib.mkForce "strict";
|
||||
serviceConfig.ReadWritePaths = [ stateDir ];
|
||||
};
|
||||
} // (lib.mapAttrs' (name: job:
|
||||
lib.nameValuePair "hortusfox-cron-${name}" {
|
||||
description = "HortusFox cronjob: ${name}";
|
||||
after = [ "nginx.service" ];
|
||||
serviceConfig = {
|
||||
after = [ "${cfg.proxy.server}.service" ];
|
||||
serviceConfig = commonHardening // {
|
||||
Type = "oneshot";
|
||||
User = cfg.user;
|
||||
ExecStart = "${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -fsS --max-time 300 "
|
||||
+ "${appUrl}${job.path}";
|
||||
ExecStart = "${cronScript name job}";
|
||||
# Only touches the filesystem to read cronPwFile back -- stateDir
|
||||
# stays visible (read-only) under ProtectSystem=strict since it
|
||||
# isn't under /home, so no ReadWritePaths/ReadOnlyPaths needed.
|
||||
ProtectSystem = "strict";
|
||||
ProtectHome = "tmpfs";
|
||||
};
|
||||
}) cronjobs);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -413,6 +641,17 @@ in {
|
||||
user = cfg.user;
|
||||
group = cfg.group;
|
||||
phpPackage = phpPackage;
|
||||
# PHP's own stock defaults (upload_max_filesize=2M, post_max_size=8M)
|
||||
# are far below what both proxy configs below already allow through
|
||||
# (nginx's client_max_body_size / caddy's request_body.max_size, both
|
||||
# 64M) -- without this, PHP itself truncates/rejects any plant photo
|
||||
# upload past 2M (a single modern phone camera JPEG, easily) before
|
||||
# PlantsModel::editPlantPhoto ever sees it, surfacing as a bare
|
||||
# "Errorneous file" 500 with no indication it was ever a size limit.
|
||||
phpOptions = ''
|
||||
upload_max_filesize = 64M
|
||||
post_max_size = 64M
|
||||
'';
|
||||
settings = {
|
||||
"listen.owner" = if cfg.proxy.server == "caddy" then config.services.caddy.user else config.services.nginx.user;
|
||||
"listen.group" = if cfg.proxy.server == "caddy" then config.services.caddy.group else config.services.nginx.group;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -92,5 +92,12 @@ pkgs.testers.nixosTest {
|
||||
assert "/auth" not in final_url, (
|
||||
f"login didn't redirect away from /auth -- login failed (landed on {final_url}):\n{login_response}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# The cron units curl the app's own cronjob endpoints with a `?cronpw=`
|
||||
# query param matching AppModel.cronjob_pw -- exercise one directly
|
||||
# rather than just trusting it, since this exact wiring broke silently
|
||||
# in production (every cron request 403'd, forever, with nothing short
|
||||
# of reading the journal ever surfacing it) before this assertion existed.
|
||||
machine.succeed("systemctl start hortusfox-cron-tasks-recurring.service")
|
||||
'';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user